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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

TOM SNYDER,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
:
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation and
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney
for Murray City Corporation,
Defendants/Appellees.

Case No.

20010203-SC

:
Priority No. 15
:

AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, the Hon. Stephen L. Henriod
presiding.
(Trial Court Case No. 99-090-7806 CV)

Plaintiff/Appellant submits the following brief:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953 as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1)

Whether Murray City Corporation and H. Craig Hall

violated appellant Tom Snyder's constitutional rights by denying
Snyder the opportunity to give his prayer during the time set
aside for prayers.

2)

Whether Snyder's prayer is religious in nature and

afforded protection under the Utah Constitution.

ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED
1)

The issue of whether Murray City Corporation and H.

Craig Hall violated appellant Tom Snyder's constitutional rights
by denying him the opportunity to give his prayer during the time
set aside for prayers was raised and considered at hearing on
April 18, 2000.

In addition, this issues was raised in

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
Memorandum, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting Memorandum

(See R. 104, 211, 218, 227, 443, 435 &

456) .
2)

The issue of whether Snyder's prayer is religious in

nature and afforded protection under the Utah Constitution, was
raised and considered at hearing on April 18, 2000.

In addition,

this issues was raised in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
and supporting Memorandum, and Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting Memorandum

(See R. 104, 211, 218, 227,

443, 435 & 456).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1)

The issues presented are questions of law.

As such,

they are reviewed under the "correctness" standard.

State v.

Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Certified Surety Group, Ltd.

2

v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998)("In reviewing a
trial court's grant of summary judgment, 'we do not defer to the
trial court's conclusion of law but review them for
correctness.'" (citation omitted)).
2)

The underlying facts are not in dispute and should be

reviewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs/appellants.
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982) (court to
present facts and reasonable inferences from them in a light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment); Harnicher v.
University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) (on summary
judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Murray City Corporation has a practice that all Murray City
Council meetings start with a prayer.

Plaintiff/appellant, Tom

Snyder, wrote a letter asking to be allowed to present a prayer
before the Murray City Council.

Snyder enclosed a copy of the

prayer that he would present.
Appellee, H. Craig Hall, informed Snyder that his Opening
Prayer was unacceptable and that Snyder could not offer his
prayer in the opening ceremonies of a City Council meeting.
Snyder filed a federal lawsuit.

See Snyder v. Murray City

Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995), reh'g denied, 902 F.
Supp. 1455 (D. Utah 1995).

That matter was appealed to the Tenth
3

Circuit Court of Appeals, Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d
1349 (10th Cir. 1997), and also heard en banc,

Snyder v. Murray

City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998), cert, denied,
U.S.

, 143 L.Ed.2d 499 (1999).

were dismissed with prejudice.

Snyder's federal law claims

However, Snyder's state law

claims were dismissed without prejudice, allowing Snyder to
pursue these claims in state court.

The instant lawsuit

followed.
The parties below moved this Court to grant summary
judgment.

Upon a hearing of the parties' motions, the court

below denied Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the
City's Motion for Summary judgment.

The court below dismissed

Snyder's free speech claim as barred by the statute of
limitations.

The court below found that Mr. Snyder's prayer was

not afforded protection under Society of Separationists v.
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993), the free exercise clause nor
establishment clause of the Utah Constitution.

This timely

appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Murray City has a practice that all Murray City Council

meetings start with a prayer.

Complt., 1 13 (R. 5 ) .
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2.

Murray City has encouraged people to offer invocations

or inspirational messages, etc. at the beginning of its meetings.
Hall1 Depo., 12:1-8 (R. 144). The City told Snyder
. . . the [City] Council has established the policy
that all council meetings will start with prayer.
Hall Letter, June 1, 1994, copy attached to this Brief as
Attachment "B" (R. 128).
3.

The purpose of prayer before the Council meetings is "to

allow individuals an opportunity to express thoughts, leave
blessings, etc."

Hall Depo., 74:16-22 (R. 158); see also Hall

Depo., 24:12-18 & 25:14-24 (R. 147).
4.

The administrative decisions (A) as to who may offer a

prayer before City Council meeting; (B) as to the content of a
prayer that may be offered; and, (C) if a proposed prayer offered
is indeed a prayer and will be allowed to be presented are left
to the discretion of the City Attorney2.
15 & 22 (R. 4, 6, & 8 ) ; Snyder Aff., M

Complt., 51 7, 8, 14,
4, 10 & 11 (R. 53 & 55).

1

The deposition of defendant Craig Hall was taken in an
earlier case involving this same fact situation. Pertinent
portions of his deposition taken 09/06/1994 have been made part
of the record in this case (R. 142-175, 339-360).
2

Murray City and Hall (and his successor City Attorney)
are occasionally referred to hereinafter, collectively, as "the
City."
5

5.

Hall had and his successor has the duty of enforcing the

unwritten policy of Murray City as to the content and purpose of
prayers.

Hall Depo., 22:12-16, 70:5-11, 71:22-23, 72:23-25 (R.

147, 157); Complt., 11 22 - 23 (R. 8).
6.

On June 9, 1994 Tom Snyder wrote a letter (R. 130)

asking to be allowed to present a prayer before the City Council.
Complt., 1 17 (R. 6 ) ; Snyder Aff., 1 13 (R. 56). A copy of the
letter is attached to this Brief as Attachment "C".
7.

Snyder sought to exercise his religion and say a prayer,

in the same manner, at the same time and in the same place that
the City has allowed others to say prayers for many years.
Complt., 1 26 (R. 8-9); Snyder Aff., 1 14 (R. 56).
8.

Snyder enclosed a copy of his proposed prayer (R. 131-

Complt., 1 18 (R. 7 ) ; Snyder Aff., 1 14 (R. 56). A copy

132).

of the prayer (hereinafter the "Opening Prayer") is attached to
this Brief as Attachment "D".
9.

In a letter (R. 134) dated June 30, 1994, Hall informed

Snyder that the Opening Prayer was "unacceptable" and that based
upon the content, Snyder could not offer his prayer in the
opening ceremonies of a City Council meeting.
25 (R. 7 & 8 ) ; Snyder Aff., M

Complt., 11 20 &

16 & 21 (R. 56 & 58). A copy of

that rejection letter is attached to this Brief as Attachment
"E".
6

10.

Only after the City knew the contents of Snyder's

proposed Opening Prayer, (Hall Depo., 18-20 (R. 146)), did the
City reveal its supposed criteria for opening prayers.

The

criteria recited was tailor-made to apply to Snyder's proposed
Opening Prayer.
else.

This criteria had never been applied to anyone

Hall Depo., 12-13 (R. 144).

NO WRITTEN GUIDELINES OR CRITERIA
11.

Unwritten guidelines of Murray City (Hall Depo., 13:23-

25 (R. 144)) as to offering of prayers were orally articulated by
Hall only after Snyder sued the City for rejecting his prayer.3

3

The unwritten guidelines articulated after Snyder's
request was rejected are:
a) the prayer must be "an inspirational thought that
encourages people to be civil;" Hall Depo., 13:10-12 (R. 144);
the prayer must be civil in content; Hall Depo., 135:1-5 (R.
172); the prayer cannot be offensive; Hall Depo., 144:20-22 (R.
173);
b) the prayer must "encourage people to have lofty
thoughts;" Hall Depo., 13:13, 124:12-23 (R. 144, 169);
c) the prayer must "encourage people to focus their
attention on the items of the agenda for that night;" Hall Depo.,
13:14, 124:12-23 (R. 144, 169);
d) the opening message may not express political views,
attack, object to, or make fun of city policies or practices or
mock, ridicule, or make light of city practices or policies; Hall
Depo., 35:5-9, 35:10-13, 36:1-3, 100:14-25, 116:17-19, 124:12-23
(R. 150, 163, 167, 169);
e) the prayer must not personally attack government
officials; Hall Depo., 108:18-25, 109:1-6, 111: 23-25 (R. 165,
166) .
f) the presenter and the prayer must be "sincere" and not
"hypocritical"; Hall Depo., 97:17-24, 100:14-25, 124:12-23 (R.
162, 163, 169);

7

12.

None of the post-lawsuit criteria were ever reduced to

writing prior to Snyderfs request.

Hall Depo., 25:1-13, 119:9-

15, 151:23 thru 152:11 (R. 147, 168, 175). There have never been
written rules, guidelines or restrictions as to presentation of
prayers before Murray City Council meetings.

Hall Depo., 9:21-

22, 14:6-10, (R. 143, 145); Complt., SI 21 (R. 7 ) .
13.

The City has no appeal process to challenge or review a

denial of a request to give a prayer.

Complt., 1 27 (R. 9);

Snyder Aff., 11 20 & 22 (R. 57 & 58).

g) the prayer or opening message may not encourage or call
for insurrection, physical harm to officials or people in
attendance or incite physical violence; Hall Depo., 26:1-13,
100:14-25 (R. 148, 163);
h) political views are banned in the opening prayer; Hall
Depo., 26:13-17 (R. 148); there is no written criteria as to what
political views are to be banned; Hall Depo., 31:9-12 (R. 149);
(Hall cannot define in advance what or which political views are
banned from an opening prayer), Hall Depo., 26:13-17, 27:1-11,
29:1-6, 31:1-8, 90:8-11, 90:21-25, 91:2-7 (R. 148, 149, 161)
(according to Hall, Snyder's entire Opening Prayer constitutes a
political statement);
i) Hall cannot give "an all-inclusive definitive list" of
what can or cannot be in an opening prayer; "We have to make
decisions based on our experience and our knowledge and our
training of what may or may not be appropriate in the
invocation;" Hall Depo., 30:7-15, 32:4-9 (R. 149);
j) prayers should be two to three minutes in length; Hall
Depo., 58:1-5, 13-20 (R. 155); (but that is insignificant and has
never been a problem, Hall Depo., 58:13-20 (R. 155)); and,
k) the prayer must be consistent on its face; Hall Depo.,
71:14-19 (R. 157).
8

THE CITY'S SUBJECTIVE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE OPENING PRAYER
14.

The City claims that its does not censor prayers and

has never told anybody what to say in an invocation.

Hall Depo.,

117:5-10, 18-25 (R. 167).
15.

Hall believes that in most settings the Opening Prayer

would be considered to be a prayer.
169).

Hall Depo., 125:12-13 (R.

He understood that Snyder considered it to be a prayer.

Hall Depo., 125:5-7 (R. 169).
16.

Hall believes that it is "okay" if someone offering a

prayer before the City Council asks God for guidance for the City
leaders.
17.

Hall Depo., 83:22-25 (R. 160).
Hall is familiar with the Bible and Book of Mormon

passages (Matthew 6:5-6; 3rd Nephi 13:5-6) which recite Jesus
Christ's admonitions against offering prayers in public.

Hall

Depo., 48:12 thru 49:8 (R. 152). Hall understands that the
Opening Prayer makes reference to that mandate.

Hall Depo.,

107:14 thru p. 108:5 (R. 165).
18.

If Christ's admonitions against offering prayers in

public were read before a Murray City Council meeting, Hall would
not consider them to be "political views."
thru p. 50:17 (R. 152-153) .

9

Hall Depo., 49:23

SOME POLITICAL PRAYERS ALLOWED
19.

The City allows political views to be expressed during

the Opening Ceremonies as long as Hall agrees or finds them
appropriate.

Hall Depo., 25-26 (R. 147-148).

Hall reserves

complete and unfettered discretion to determine which political
views can be recited in opening prayers.
20.

Id.

Hall testified that the opening prayers given "during

the past 10, 12 years" have been "positive, upbeat, exhorting the
City Council to do what they [sic] ought to do under their
statutory responsibilities."
21.

Hall Depo., 25 (R. 147).

When asked "[s]o it's not all political views then that

are banned," Hall replied that "I don't know that until I see
what political views are proposed.
decision at that point."

I would have to make a

Hall Depo., 26 (R. 148). The City

allows upbeat political statements concerning the City's
lawmaking and other issues at Hall's sole discretion.

Id.

THE CITY SOUGHT DIVERSITY
22.

The City never used the term "generic" or any similar

term in connection with its opening prayers.

Hall Depo., 10,

13-14, 55-58, 77-78, 108-09 & 117 (R. 144, 144-145, 155, 158-159,
165 & 167). Prior to Snyder's litigation, the City never
suggested that opening prayers were required to be "generic."
Id.

Instead, the City sought prayers offered by individuals of
10

diverse backgrounds and representing different and distinct
portions of the community.
23.

Id.

Letters sent by the City to those interested in giving

invocations spoke only of dates and times.

Hall Depo., 12-13,

14-15 & 25 (R. 144, 145 & 147). None of the letters sent to
interested participants contained any reference to standards or
requirements to be applied to opening prayers.

Id.

No standards

or requirements were ever communicated verbally to those
interested in presenting prayers.

Id.

STATED REASONS FOR REJECTION OF OPENING PRAYER
24.

The Opening Prayer was rejected by Hall because of its

content and for no other reason.
25.

Hall Depo., 60:1-3 (R. 155).

The Opening Prayer was rejected, inter

alia,

because in

Hall's opinion the text did not encourage lofty thoughts, to be
civil and to clear the clutter of the day to get to the agenda.
Hall Depo., 71:7-13 (R. 157).
26.

According to Hall, the phrase in the Opening Prayer,

"We ask that you [God] will teach the people of Utah that
government should not participate in religion," is a banned
political statement.
27.

Hall Depo., 113:23 -114:3 (R. 166-165).

Hall believes the Opening Prayer mocked the City

Council for having invocations.

Hall Depo., 91:20-24 (R. 161).

11

28.

Hall considered the Opening Prayer as a whole and

rejected it.

Hall Depo., 116:17-19 (R. 167).

REASONS NOT CONSIDERED IN REJECTION OF OPENING PRAYER
29.

That Snyder had not been "invited" but rather initiated

the request to offer a prayer was not the reason for rejection of
the Opening Prayer.
30.
too long.
31.

Hall Depo., 59:8-13 (R. 155).

Snyder's Opening Prayer was not rejected because it was
Hall Depo., 59:5-13 (R. 155).
That the Opening Prayer may have contained alleged

threats (God requested to smite

or strike

down officials4) was

not a reason for the rejection of the Opening Prayer.

Hall

Depo., 149:11-14 (R. 174).
32.

Snyder's sincerity did not factor into the City's

refusal to allow him to offer his Opening Prayer during the
Opening Ceremonies.

Hall Depo., 54-55 (R. 154). 5

4

Snyder's use of the words smite and strike
down in the
Opening Prayer was as used in the Bible and the Book of Mormon,
to get the attention of people and to remove wrong doers from
positions of power. Snyder Aff., 1 31 (R. 159-160); Chatterjee
Aff. 1 11 & 1 12 (R. 35-36).
5

After litigation was filed, Hall questions whether
Snyder's beliefs expressed in the Opening Prayer were sincere.
Hall Depo., 52:4-8, 92:9-14, 92:18-21 (R. 153, 161) (the whole
prayer "reeks with insincerity"). Hall believed the Opening
Prayer to be hypocritical or insincere and inconsistent. Hall
Depo., 69:5-10 (R. 156). Hall claims the ability to determine
whether a person is sincere in their religious beliefs. Hall
Depo., 100:1-8 (R. 163). Hall claims the ability to read a
12

33.

In reply to Snyder's request to give a prayer, Hall

does not mention civility, loftiness or attention to the agenda.
Hall Letters, June 1 and 30, 1994, (attached to this Brief,
Attachments "B" & "E").
deposition was taken,

Until suit was filed and until Hall's
Snyder was not informed of any City policy

other than:
. . . the Council has established the policy that all
council meetings will start with prayer.
The purpose of the "prayer" is to allow
individuals that opportunity to express thoughts, leave
blessing, etc. It is not a time to express political
views, attack city policies or practices or mock city
practices or policies.
Hall Letter, June 1, 1994 (R. 128). Copy attached to this Brief,
Attachment "B".
SNYDER'S RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS
34.

Snyder6 considers himself to be deeply religious, but

is not exactly sure what he believes.
religious truth.

He is searching for

Snyder Depo., 15:1-10, 22:1-10, 24:1-3, 56:23

thru 57:1, 57:14-19 (R. 178, 180, 181, 188). Snyder leans toward

document and determine whether its author is sincere. Hall
Depo., 98:6-10 (R. 163) ("You know it when you see it.").
6

The deposition of plaintiff Tom Snyder was taken in an
earlier case involving this same fact situation. Pertinent
portions of his deposition taken 09/07/1994 were made part of the
record in this case (R. 177-195, 362-402).
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agnosticism.7

Snyder Depo., 14:17-21 (R. 178). He was born and

raised in the LDS faith.
35.

Snyder Depo., 13:1-13 (R. 178).

Snyder's personal and strongly held religious belief is

that prayers are a private matter between an individual and his
or her God.
prayers.

Jesus Christ specifically spoke against public

Matthew 6:5-6 of the New Testament and 3rd Nephi 13:5-6

of the Book of Mormon (see R. 136); Snyder Aff., 1 26 (R. 58-59).
36.

In Matthew and 3rd Nephi, Christ denounced the

hypocrites that prayed out loud in a public show "that they may
be seen of men" and exhorted follower to pray privately alone at
Snyder Aff., 11 26 - 27 (R. 58-59).

home.

37.

Snyder has a strong and abiding aversion to public

praying.

Snyder Depo., 30:1-10, 62:4-6, 85:8-12, 51:19 thru

52:16, 53:1-5, 10 (R. 182, 189, 194, 187). Snyder's religious
teachings are that a person should not pray publicly or on a
street corner to be seen of men, but should pray to God in
secret, in one's closet to God who hears such prayers.

Matthew

6:5-6, 3rd Nephi 13:5-6 (R. 136).

7

An agnostic is a person that does not know whether there
is a God. An agnostic takes the position that there can be no
proof as to whether a God exists. The questioning tone of some
of the Opening Prayer appears to be that of an agnostic.
Chatterjee Aff., 1 15 (R. 37).
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38.

Snyder's personal strongly held religious belief is

that every person enjoys the right to practice their own religion
according to the dictates of their own conscience and that all
men and women should be allowed that privilege and be allowed to
worship how, where, or what they may.
39.

Snyder Aff., 1 29 (R. 59).

Although Supreme Court decisions allow prayers before

City Council meetings, Snyder disagrees on a political and
religious basis.

Snyder believes that Murray City Council should

cease such prayers.

Snyder believes that those who continue to

have such prayers act without wisdom and without an understanding
of the religious nature of prayer.

Snyder Aff., SI 28 (R. 59).

DEVELOPMENT, CONTENT AND PURPOSE OF OPENING PRAYER
40.

The Opening Prayer addresses public prayers sponsored

and encouraged by government entities.

Complt., 1 19 (R. 7 ) ;

Snyder Aff., I 15 (R. 56). The Opening Prayer represents a
religious message (Snyder Depo., 88:14-21 (R. 195)) and
communicates Snyder's thoughts.

Snyder Depo., 74:25, 76:3-5,

78:1-3 (R. 191, 192).
41.

The Opening Prayer represents Snyder's deeply held and

sincere religious beliefs.

Snyder's personal religious beliefs

include philosophical and political ideas.

Snyder can not

separate his political views, his philosophical ideas and his
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religious beliefs (Snyder Aff., SI 24 (R. 58)); Snyder Depo.,
15:11-17, 21:17-24 (R. 179, 180).
42.

Snyder developed and drafted the Opening Prayer after

much thought and based upon consultation with others.

Snyder

Aff., 5 25 (R. 58). Snyder wanted to present this entreaty as a
prayer and not solely as a political statement before the Murray
City Council.
43.

Id.

Snyder wanted the Murray City Council members to

question whether they were misusing religion by having prayers
before their meetings.
44.

Snyder Depo., 75:2-8 (R. 192).

Snyder's prayer was, in part, a protest of the City's

practice of prayer.

Snyder Depo., 61:15-17, 67:2-5, 82:6-11,

87:5-10 (R. 189, 190, 193, 195). The Opening Prayer was to make
the City Council re-think their practice of prayer before their
meetings.
45.

Snyder Depo., 76:3-5 (R. 192).
Snyder hoped his prayer would spark debate and

discussion.

Snyder Depo., 58:3-8, 62:13-18 (R. 188, 189) (an

education process; it would force the Council to think); 78:20-24
(R. 192); 79:8-14 (R. 193) (to initiate thought); 87:5-10 (R.
195) .
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46.

Philosophy Professor Deen Chatterjee8 examined the

Opening Prayer.

Chatterjee Aff., 1 4 (R. 33). He found the

Opening Prayer, in format and content, to unquestionably be a
prayer, an entreaty asking a deity to influence the day-to-day
affairs of humans.

The Opening Prayer has the classic construct

and substance of a prayer.
47.

Chatterjee Aff., OT 5-6 (R. 33).

Prayers often contain or display political views, along

with philosophical ideas and religious beliefs.

Philosophical,

political and religious beliefs intertwine and often religious
beliefs include or are indistinguishable from political ideas.
Chatterjee Aff., 11 7-9 (R. 34-35).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Free Speech:
By refusing to allow Tom Snyder to pray before the Murray
City Council, the City violated the free speech provisions of the
Utah Constitution.

The lower court erred in dismissing Snyder's

free speech claim based upon a statute of limitations.
court misapprehends Snyder's claim.

The City's wrongdoing has

continued since 1994 and continues today.

8

The lower

The City still lacks

Deen Chatterjee is an associate professor of philosophy
at the University of Utah. Chatterjee Aff., 1 2 (R. 33).
Chatterjee's background and study of philosophy includes the
study of religion. Chatterjee Aff., 1 3 (R. 33).
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guidelines and criteria as to who can speak during the prayer
portions of the Opening Ceremonies of the City Council meetings.
Snyder's Free Speech claim is a facial challenge to the current
unwritten policies and practices of the City.
Snyder's free speech claim turns upon the type forum in
question.

By its actions, the City has designated the opening

ceremony as a public forum open to members of the community for
the purpose of conveying thoughts and ideas.

As a result, the

City must demonstrate a compelling state interest in order to
control the content of messages conveyed during the opening
exercise.

The City has failed to demonstrate such a compelling

interest.

Rather, the City examined the content of Snyder's

proposed prayer and rejected it based thereon.

Opening the forum

to speech, then disallowing Snyder the right to speak in that
forum, constitutes a violation of the free speech protections of
the Utah Constitution.
Free Exercise:
The City's refusal to permit Snyder's prayer violates his
right to the free exercise of his religion.

Snyder's free

exercise claim turns upon the application of Society of
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 935 (Utah 1993).

The

Utah Constitution demands perfect toleration of religious
sentiment.

Based on this strong language, this Court concluded
18

that the Utah Constitution mandates government neutrality toward
religious practices.
The lower court, however, determined incorrectly that
Snyder's supplication was not a valid religious belief and denied
Snyder's free exercise claim.

The best indication of Snyder's

religious beliefs are his personal statements.

The scrutiny of

the validity of particular beliefs is largely beyond judicial
ken.

Thus, the lower court erred in dismissing the sincerity of

Snyder's belief.
The court below should have accepted as true Snyder's
sincerity.
exercise.

Snyder's supplication is a prayer and a religious
The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's

religious exercise.

Thus, the City violated Snyder's right to

perfect religious toleration.
Establishment Clause:
Refusing to allow Snyder to pray before the Murray City
Council, the City violated the establishment clause of the Utah
Constitution.

The lower court's determination of Snyder's

establishment clause claim was linked to whether Snyder's prayer
was indeed a "prayer".

The lower court determined that the

mandate of neutrality was meet because Snyder was afforded the
opportunity to speak during a subsequent portion of the meeting
(public comment period).

Relegating Snyder to the public comment
19

period because the City finds Snyder's prayer offensive is as
unconstitutional as entirely banning his prayer from the meeting.
Government must maintain neutrality between those whose
consciences are persuaded by religion and those whose consciences
are not.

Government must not prefer religion to non-religion,

but neither should it be hostile to religion.

Religious exercise

must be unfettered and freedom of conscience is to be supreme.
The City violated the Utah Constitution by their denial of
Snyder's request.

They provided a forum on public property and

as part of a public ceremony.

However, they denied Snyder use of

it based on the contents of his prayer.

The City's bias against

Snyder's religious message violates the "neutrality principle" of
the Utah Constitution.

Those, like Snyder, who express non-

traditional religious tenets, are prohibited from participating
in offerings before the City Council.
The City's banning of Snyder's prayer impermissibly
establishes religion in violation of the Utah Constitution.

The

City determines which religious beliefs are appropriate for
public recitation.

The City makes no attempt to be neutral.

The

City acknowledges no obligation to be neutral in determining who
can pray before a City Council meeting.
The City's criteria in considering a prayer means a minute
examination of the contents.

The City should not examine or sit
20

in judgment of a proposed prayer.

Therefore, the City

impermissibly "establishes" a religion in violation of the Utah
Constitution as interpreted in Society of Separationists.
Due Process:
The City's summary denial of Snyder's request to present his
prayer is a violation of Snyder's right to due process.

The City

created a protected interest when it created the Opening
Ceremonies as a public forum for expression.

Once the City

created this forum, all must have equal access for the expression
of their views.

Government benefits, such as the use of the

City's property during the Opening Ceremonies, must be provided
on a nondiscriminatory basis and must be equally accessible to
all.
The essential requirements of due process are notice and an
opportunity to respond.

The City has failed to supply Snyder

with even basic protection.

The City did so without any criteria

or hearing, thus it violated Snyder's due process rights.

ARGUMENT
I.

FREE SPEECH CLAIM: BY REFUSING TO ALLOW SNYDER TO PRAY
BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY COUNCIL, THE CITY VIOLATED ARTICLE I,
§ 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The court below erred in dismissing Snyder's free speech

claim made under Article I, § 15 of the Utah Constitution.
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See

Memorandum Decision, p. 1 (R. 474). The court dismissed Mr.
Snyder's free speech claim based on a five (5) year9 statute of
limitations.

Id. (R. 474).

The court below misapprehends Snyder's claim.

While the

City in a letter dated June 30, 1994, rejected Snyder's Opening
Prayer, that was not the discreet end of the City's misconduct.
The City's wrongdoing continues today and has continued since
1994.

As of the date of this Brief in 2001, the City still lacks

guidelines and criteria as to who can speak during the prayer
portions of the Opening Ceremonies of the City Council meetings.
In 1994, in 1999 (when this action was filed) and even today, the
City claims the right to reject a prayer based upon a subjective
unwritten criteria.

The City takes the position, even now, that

Utah law does not afford Snyder access to the prayer portion of
the City Council meetings.

Therefore, Snyder's Free Speech claim

is a facial challenge to the current unwritten policies and
practices of the City.
Furthermore, Snyder's Complaint clearly asks for prospective
injunctive relief.

Complaint, 1 1, 1 4, $ 54 (R. 2, 3, 15), & 1

9

Counsel for appellant finds no five (5) year statute of
limitations under Utah law. The court was likely referring to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (3) (1953 as amended) which is Utah's
"catch-all" provision allowing suits within four (4) years of a
loss as to "relief not otherwise provided by law."
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4 (relief) (R. 1 6 ) .

That equitable relief is based upon

continuing misconduct of the City.

The factual allegations of

the Complaint recite the status of the City's prayer policy as of
the date of the Complaint

(August 1999), as well as the prior

problems in 1994. 10
The Complaint recites:
Murray City has no adopted written rules, regulations,
policies or practices to govern what religious exercises or
prayers may be offered by what entities, when or under what
circumstances before a Murray City Council meeting. Murray
City has no specifically adopted written guidelines or
policies regarding the nature and/or content of prayers that
may be offered before meetings of the Murray City Council.
Complaint 1 21 (R. 7-8)
13 (R. 5 ) .

(emphasis added); see also Complaint, 1

In addition, Snyder alleges an ongoing violation as

follows:
An administrative decision as to who may say a prayer
before the Murray City Council was and is left to the sole
discretion of defendant Craig Hall or his successor. An
administrative decision as to the content of religious
exercise or prayer to be offered before a meeting of the
Murray City Council is left to the sole discretion of
defendant Hall or his successor.

10

All of the well plead allegations of the Complaint are
deemed admitted for two (2) reasons:
1) Defendants never filed an Answer denying the allegations,
instead defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment; and,
2) in considering a Summary Judgment Motion (in a trial
court or on appeal) all facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party.
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Complaint 1 22 (R. 8) (emphasis added).
Defendant Hall had and his successor has the
administrative power on behalf of Murray City to determine
if a proposed prayer is appropriate and will be allowed to
be recited before a Murray City Council meeting.
Complaint f 23 (R. 8) (emphasis added).

And finally,

Defendants have established no appeal process whereby a
party can challenge or have reviewed a denial by the City or
its agent of a request to give a prayer before a Murray City
Council meeting.
Complaint 1 24 (R. 8)(emphasis added).

As a result, the court

below erred in holding that Snyder's free speech claim is barred
by the statute of limitations.
Snyder's free speech claim turns upon the type of forum in
question.
of fora:

The United States Supreme Court recognizes three types
1) traditional, or "quintessentially" public; 2)

limited public; and 3) nonpublic.

A traditional public forum is

a forum which "by long tradition or by government fiat [has] been
devoted to assembly and debate . . . ."

Perry, Education Assn.

v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).

A

limited public forum is "generally open to the public even if
[the state] was not required to create the forum in the first
place."

Id.

A nonpublic forum is a forum which "is not by

tradition or designation a forum for public communication . . .
."

Id.
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The City argued that the Opening Ceremony is a nonpublic
forum and as such, they were justified in limiting the speech
therein.

The City is in error.

While the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals did not review Snyder's free speech claims, the dissent
nevertheless addressed this issue.
F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 1999).

See Snyder v. Murray, 159

The dissent analyzed whether the

reverence period was a designated public forum or nonpublic
forum:
"A designated public forum is property the government
has opened for expressive activity, treating the property as
if it were a traditional public forum." Summum [v.
Callaahanl, 130 F.3d[, 906] at 914 [(10th Cir. 1997)]. Such
a forum "may be created for a limited purpose such as use by
certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain
subjects." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7.
•

*

*

"The government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 802, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
To determine whether the government has intentionally
created a designated public forum, we look to "the policy
and practice of the government," as well as "the nature of
the property and its compatibility with expressive
activity." Id.
Since 1982, the City in this case has incorporated a
reverence period as part of the opening ceremonies of its
City Council meetings. Speakers during the reverence period
are not public officials. Rather, the City has "made
efforts to assure that a broad cross-section of the
community would be represented" during the reverence period
. . . . To effectuate this goal, Jewel Chandler, the
secretary to the City Council, regularly "compiles lists of
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various denominations and other groups'' who she thinks
"would be potentially willing to come to the City Council
meetings based on invitation to give a thought, prayer,
whatever."
•

*

•

According to the City, participants in the reverence
period "have included representatives from Zen Buddhists,
Native Americans, a cross section of Judeo-Christian
congregations, Quakers, and others." [citing the appellate
appendix]. The invitations contain no restrictions on the
messages that speakers can give. Further, at no time (save
for this case) has the City ever asked a particular speaker
about content of a message or conveyed any guidelines to a
particular speaker. In fact, City Attorney Hall testified:
I don't have a clue . . . what the Murray
Baptist Church is going to say just as I did not
have a clue as to what the Zen Buddhists were
going to say. I don't know what the religious
beliefs are. I don't know the particular tenants
[sic] of their religious beliefs. I don't have
a clue what they're going to say.
[citing the appellate appendix].

Hall also testified:

If a person wants to talk in the Buddhist
faith about exhortation and blessings, that's
fine. If the Navajos want to come in and do what
they do.
If the Catholics and Buddhists and
Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists come in and
don't mock city practices and policies and
procedures during that period of time, we're not
going to determine what their expression of
thought or their statements are going to be.
[citing the appellate appendix]. Finally, prior to Snyder's
request to speak, the City had not developed any guidelines
concerning the content of messages that could be given
during the reverence period.
Taken together, I believe these uncontroverted facts
demonstrate an intent on the part of the City to designate
the reverence period as a public forum open to members of
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the community for the purpose of conveying religious and/or
inspirational messages. In reaching this conclusion, I find
significant (1) the City's goal of having a broad
cross-section of the community speak during the reverence
period, and (2) the lack of restrictions placed on reverence
period speakers. To me, both of these factors indicate the
City's intent to treat the reverence period as a setting
open to all community members, regardless of religious
viewpoint.
Snyder, 153 F.3d at 1244-45 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).

The analysis at bar is no different.

The Opening

Ceremony is a limited (or designated) public forum.

As a result

. . . the City's ability to control the content of messages
conveyed during the reverence period is much more limited
than suggested . . . .
"For the State to enforce a
content-based exclusion" when dealing with access to any
type of public forum, "it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry, 460 U.S. at
45.
Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1246 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
not done so.

The City has

The sole interest that the City has asserted is its

right to promote "high mindedness", "order" and "civility."
These are simply not compelling interests to justify the
restriction of free speech under the Utah Constitution.11
The City cannot have it both ways: it cannot purport to
open the reverence period to a broad cross-section of the
community without restrictions, while at the same time

11

The First Amendment and Utah's constitutional free
speech provision would be meaningless if protected speech was
only that which is "high minded," "civil" and "orderly." See
Memorandum Decision, at 8.
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limiting a particular speaker's access to the reverence
period because of its distaste for the speaker's proposed
message. Thus, I believe it must either allow Snyder the
opportunity to give his tendered prayer or cease its
currently-formatted reverence period altogether.
Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1246-47 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).

The City

created a public forum where people are allowed to express their
ideas, religious and non-religious.

Nevertheless, the City

determined that Snyder could not give his prayer based upon the
content of the prayer.

The City examined the content of the

prayer Snyder proposed to offer and rejected it.

Opening the

forum to religious speech, then disallowing Snyder the right to
speak in that forum, constitutes a violation of the free speech
protections of the Utah Constitution.12
As a result, this Court should reverse the dismissal of
Snyder's free speech claims.
II.

FREE EXERCISE CLAIM: DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO PERMIT SNYDER'S
PRAYER VIOLATES SNYDER'S RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE I, § 4, UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Snyder's free exercise claim turns upon the correct

application of Society of Seoarationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d

12

Article I, § 15 of the Utah Constitution reads in
pertinent part:
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom
of speech . . . ."
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916, 935 (Utah 1993).

Utah Constitution Article III demands that

"[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed."
Based on this strong language, Society of Separationists v.
Whitehead, concluded that the Utah Constitution mandated
government neutrality toward religious practices.

Id. at 936.

Thus, the Utah Constitution provides plaintiff Snyder more
protection than the United States Constitution.
agreed.

The court below

Memorandum Decision, 3 (R. 476) .

Nevertheless, the lower court determined incorrectly that
Snyder's supplication was not a valid "religious belief' or a
valid prayer.

Memorandum Decision, 2 & 3 (R. 475-476);

Memorandum Decision, 9 (R. 482) ("Mr. Snyder's statement is not a
prayer").
religious.

The lower court found that Snyder's statement was nonThe court below thus also incorrectly determined that

Snyder did not have a valid free exercise claim.

See Memorandum

Decision, 4 (R. 477) ("To be valid, a free exercise claim must
involve a ^religious belief.'").
Society of Separationists defined a prayer as "an address of
entreaty, supplication, praise or thanksgiving directed to some
sacred or divine spirit, being or object."

Id. at 931-32

(quoting Karen B. v. Trenn, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981),
aff'd 455 U.S. 913 (1982)).

In Utah, an address which calls upon

a supreme entity is prayer and is religious exercise even though
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it may appear to be non-religious or have a secular purpose:
"That [a prayer] may contemplate some wholly secular objective
cannot alter the inherently religious character of the exercise."
Id.
The best and only reliable indication of Snyder's
earnestness are his own sworn statements that he is indeed
sincere.

Under oath, Snyder stated:

[My] personal and strongly held religious belief is that
prayers are a private matter between an individual and his
or her God. [My] religious upbringing and beliefs lead [me]
to believe that Jesus Christ specifically spoke out against
public prayers, including prayers before government
meetings.
Snyder Aff., 1 26 (R. 58-59).

In making this assertion, Snyder

relies on Matthew 6:5-6 from the New Testament and 3 Nephi 13:5-6
from the Book of Mormon.

Furthermore, Snyder believes

[u]sing God's name or the name of Christ in a public prayer
(directly contrary to God's clear teaching) is blasphemous,
irreverent, and impious misuse of those names.
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, 1 33 (R. 88).
In Mosier v. Mavnard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991), the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that personal
statements, rather than external evidence, are the primary
indicia of sincere beliefs.

Id.

In Mosier, an inmate claimed a

religious exemption to the prison grooming code based upon his
adherence to the Native American Religion.
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Id. at 1523.

The Appellate Court overturned the District Court's
determination that the inmate's religious beliefs were insincere.
Id. at 1524.

Relying on a prison chaplain's testimony, the

District Court incorrectly determined that there was not enough
"external evidence" that the inmate "actually practiced his
beliefs . . . ."

Id., at

. As a result, the District Court

incorrectly ruled that the inmate was not entitled to a religious
exemption based on external evidence.
The prison's reliance on external evidence to show sincerity
was misplaced.

The Appellate Court questioned if the prison's

policy sufficiently "accommodates [the] personal nature of belief
and the primacy of personal statements and conduct when one seeks
an exemption."

Id. at 1527.

The Appellate Court opined:

. . . [the] prison's policy of denying the sincerity of a
prisoner's religious beliefs unless he submits reputable
non-family references vouching for sincerity represents a
very limited approach to this question of fact. The policy
prefers one type of corroborative evidence to the exclusion
of all other types, both direct and indirect.
Id.13

13

Importantly, because of its prison setting, Mosier
requires that a lower standard of scrutiny be applied to the
prison's policy than is applicable to the City's misconduct
herein. Id. at 1525, citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 349 (1987) ("What might be viewed as an unreasonable
infringement of a fundamental constitutional right were it to
occur outside of prison may be valid in prison as long as the
infringement is reasonable related to legitimate penological
objective . . . " ) .
Thus, particularly telling is that the Court
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The "scrutiny of the validity of particular beliefs largely
is beyond . . . judicial function because 'religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.'"

Mosier,

937 F.2d at 1526 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Empl.
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).14
In the case at bar, the court below erred in dismissing the
sincerity of Snyder's belief.

Snyder's sincerity and the

religious nature of Snyder's beliefs are evident.

He cites the

religious basis for his opposition to public prayer.

Snyder

strongly believes not that it is merely unwise or politically

rejected the prison's undue reliance on external evidence and
insufficient attention to Hosier's personal statements, even
under this reduced standard.
14

This Court recently addressed the constitutional
aversion of the judiciary to examine religious practices in
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 Utah
Lexis 43, 2001 UT 25, 416 Utah Adv. Rep. 32,
P.2d
(Utah
2001):
. . . it is well settled that civil tort claims against
clerics that require the courts to review and interpret
church law, policies, or practices in the determination
of the claims are barred by the First Amendment under
the entanglement doctrine, [citations omitted]. For, as
the Supreme Court stated in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 97 L. Ed. 120, 73 S. Ct. 143
(1952), churches must have "power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine." [citation omitted].
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manipulative to open public meetings with prayer, but that it is
blasphemy.

His belief is based on his religious upbringing and

his understanding of commandments of Jesus Christ.

His

convictions are sincerely-held religious beliefs, protected under
Utah's Constitution.
Furthermore, Snyder's motivation for giving his Opening
Prayer—to share with the City Council his aversion to public
prayer as dictated by his religious views—is not any more
indicative of the sincerity of his beliefs than the City's
assessment of Snyder's state of mind.

An individual's

motivations are not indicative of sincerity.

Snyder can

consistently hold beliefs—for example that God might be female,
that public prayer is hypocritical and that a wall should be
erected between church and state—and simultaneously wish to
present these beliefs at the Opening Ceremonies.

Indeed, the

sincerity of Snyder's beliefs prompted his desire to share these
beliefs for the reasons the City finds so disturbing.

Snyder

wanted to explain the impropriety of the City's public prayer
policy to the City's government.

There is no better forum to

suggest the religiously based impropriety of government sponsored
prayer than during the portion of the opening ceremony designed
for sharing religious ideas.
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The court below should have accepted as true Snyder's
sincerity.
exercise.

Snyder's Opening Prayer is a prayer and a religious
The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's

religious exercise.

Thus, the court below erred in failing to

find that under Society of Separationists, Murray City violated
Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right to perfect religious toleration.
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIM: BY REFUSING TO ALLOW SNYDER TO
PRAY BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY COUNCIL, THE CITY VIOLATED
ARTICLE I, § 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The lower court's determination of Snyder's establishment
clause claim was likewise linked to whether Snyder's prayer was
indeed a "prayer".

See Memorandum Decision, 7-8 (R. 480-481)

("Whether or not the Utah Supreme Court in Society of
Separationists envisioned that governmental neutrality would
encompass a Sprayer' such as Snyder's Sprayer' is unclear.")15.
Again, the lower court determined that Snyder's statement was not
a prayer.

Memorandum Decision, 9 (R. 482). The lower court

appears to suggest that because Snyder was afforded "the
opportunity to speak during the later portion of the meeting"
that the mandate of neutrality was meet.

15

Memorandum Decision, 9.

This rhetorical question is answered in Society of
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938, by holding that even Atheists
can offer prayers before government meetings. One would assume
that an atheist prayer would be comparable to Snyder's Opening
Prayer.
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The public comment period is not set aside for prayer and
does not have the prestige or influence enjoyed by the Opening
Ceremonies.

The City cannot justify its discrimination against

Snyder's religious message by suggesting that he could have
spoken at another time.

The lower court erred in so suggesting.

Relegating Snyder to the public comment period ("to the back of
the bus") because the City finds Snyder's prayer offensive is as
unconstitutional as entirely banning his prayer from the meeting.
The fact remains that the City does not have a policy
regarding opening prayers that it communicated or applied to any
individual other than Snyder.

Not until Snyder sought an

opportunity to recite his prayer during the Opening Ceremony, did
the City create and apply certain selective standards to Snyder
and his prayer.
Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution does not permit public
expenditures and the use of public property to "directly" benefit
religious exercise.

Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870

P.2d 916, 936-37 (Utah 1993).

Thus, the City may encourage

public prayer at its Council meetings only when "the state is
neutral" and thus "indirectly" benefitting religious exercise.
To be neutral, government benefits "must be provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis" and "must be equally accessible to all."
Id. at 938.

Thus, "if a city permits groups to use city-owned
35

facilities, that use must be permitted without regard to the
belief system of the user."

Id. (emphasis added).

In addition,

"the government must implement a system that awards the benefit
so that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically
equal opportunity for the use of the public resource."

Id.

(emphasis added).
In Society of Separationists, the district court granted
summary judgment ruling that the Salt Lake City Council violated
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution which provides, in
pertinent part, "No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment."
The district court in Society of Separationists held that
the City Council had impermissibly expended public money and had
used public property to support religious exercise when it
encouraged and permitted prayer during the City Council meetings'
opening ceremony.

The district court permanently enjoined

further expenditures for such purposes and from allowing prayer
before its meetings.
This Court reversed the district court and concluded that
the City Council's practice did not offend Article I, § 4.
ruling, however, this Court discussed and analyzed in great
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In so

detail Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.

As noted, that

interpretation of Article I, § 4 and its application control the
action at bar.
In Society of Separationists, this Court held that Article
I, § 4 mandates only "governmental neutrality."

This Court found

Article I, § 4 commands "neutrality in the use of public money or
property" in the support of religious exercises.
This Court read the Utah Constitution to allow indirect aid
to religion, such as prayers before government meetings, provided
the state remains neutral.
When the state is neutral, any benefit flowing to religious
worship, exercise, or instruction can be fairly
characterized as indirect because the benefit flows to all
those who are beneficiaries of the use of government money
or property, which may include, but is not limited to, those
engaged in religious worship, exercise, or instruction. We
therefore read this neutrality requirement into the "no
public money or property" language of article I, § 4.
Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 937-938.
This Court then described the elements necessary for
neutrality:
First, the money or property must be provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Some examples may be of
assistance. If a city permits groups to use city-owned
facilities, that use must be permitted without regard to the
belief system of the user. Lutherans or Latter-day Saints
who wish to use the facilities must have access on exactly
the same terms as the Loyal Order of Moose, the American
Atheist Society, or the Libertarian Party. . . .
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Second, the public money or property must be equally
accessible to all. . . . [T]he terms of access must be such
that all users have a realistically equal opportunity to
receive the benefit based on criteria that are unrelated to
their belief systems. In other words, the government must
implement a system that awards the benefit so that each
group, religious or secular, has a realistically equal
opportunity for the use of the public resource. For if
government allows all groups to apply for the benefit but
then discriminates in the selection process, it would be
preferring one group over the other in violation of the
constitutional principle of neutrality.
at 938 (footnote omitted).
This Court then addressed the Salt Lake City Council's
cy, and determined that the City's practice complied with the
State Constitution.

This Court stated:

In reaching this conclusion, we follow the two-step analysis
of constitutional neutrality articulated above. First, we
conclude that the expenditures made in connection with the
arrangement for and provision of facilities for opening
remarks were provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. The
expenditures were not for the religious exercise itself, but
for the meeting and that portion of the agenda that consists
of generic opening thoughts, some of which may include
prayers. Furthermore, the Separationists have not shown
that the City Council favored particular religions or
religion in general in scheduling participants. To the
contrary, the record indicates that the City Council made
efforts to assure that a broad cross-section of the
community was represented. We conclude that any use of
public money or property for facilitating the giving of
opening remarks was made on a nondiscriminatory basis
without regard to the belief systems of the speakers.
Second, the Separationists have not shown that the City
Council's policy denied any group or individual a
realistically equal opportunity to participate in favor of
particular religious groups or speakers or of religious
speakers in general.
at 938-939.
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Thus, under the Utah Constitution government should not
prefer religion over non-religion.

Furthermore, government must

maintain neutrality between those whose consciences are persuaded
by religion and those whose consciences are not.
Government is not to prefer religion to nonreligion, but
neither should it be hostile to religion.

Religious exercise is

to be unfettered and freedom of conscience is to be supreme.
. . . [T]he drafters of the Utah Constitution . . . wisely
concluded that it was best to maintain neutrality among
various religious groups as well as between those whose
consciences were persuaded by religion and those whose
consciences were not.
Id. at 946 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The City violated Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution
interpreted by Society of Separationists by the denial of
Snyder's request.

The City flunks both prongs of the Society of

Separationists neutrality test.

They provided a forum on public

property and as part of a public ceremony.

However, they denied

Snyder use of it based on the contents of his prayer.
The City's bias against Snyder's religious message violates
the "neutrality principle" of Art. I, § 4.

Id^ at 937-938.

The

City has provided a state benefit—the opportunity to speak during
its Opening Ceremonies—to only some religious practitioners.
Those, like Snyder, who express non-traditional religious tenets,
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are prohibited from participating in religious offerings before
the City Council.
As noted, the City's argument that it could refuse to allow
Snyder to participate in the Opening Ceremonies because Snyder's
message was "political" also fails.

Under Art. I, § 4, the City

cannot discriminate against Snyder because it finds his religious
message is secular.16
938.

Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at

The City implies that Society of Separationists requires

such messages to be "generic."

That decision does not authorize

governments to dictate contents of prayers.

Doing so violates

Utah's Establishment Clause.
The City does not have any policy regarding opening prayers
that it communicated or applied to any individual or group save
Snyder.

Not until Snyder sought an opportunity to recite his

prayer during the Opening Ceremony of the City Council meeting,
did the City create and then apply new and selective standards to
Snyder and his prayer.
The City's banning of Snyder's prayer impermissibly
establishes religion in violation of Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

The City determines which religious beliefs are

16

This Court ruled that even atheists are allowed to offer
"prayers" before City Council Meetings. Society of
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938.
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appropriate for public recitation.

Under the City's criteria,

applicants whose religious beliefs, such as Snyder's, that the
City deems to "mock" Council practices, are disfavored.
Applicants whose beliefs and words the City find more palatable,
are allowed to offer prayers.
neutral.

The City makes no attempt to be

The City claims it has no obligation to be neutral in

determining who can pray before a City Council meeting.17
The City's process in considering a prayer means a minute
examination of the contents of a proposed prayer based upon an
unwritten criteria.

Such an examination violates the neutrality

requirement of Society of Separationists.

Under Society of

Separationists, the City should not examine or sit in judgment of
a proposed prayer.

Therefore, the City impermissibly

"establishes" a religion in violation of Article I, § 4 as
interpreted in Society of Separationists.

17

Defendants' position is that Snyder does not have a
constitutional right to participate in the invocation portion of
the City Council meeting. Hall Depo., 70:1-6 (R. 157).
According to Hall, Society of Separationists does not hold that
everyone in the community must be given an equal and meaningful
opportunity to use a created public forum -- such as the time to
give an invocation before a City Council meeting. Hall Depo.,
129:23 thru 130:10 (R. 170-171); 130:22-25 (R. 171); 132:7-19 (R.
171) .
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IV.

DUE PROCESS: THE CITY'S SUMMARY DENIAL OF SNYDER'S REQUEST
TO PRESENT HIS PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC FORUM ESTABLISHED BY THE
CITY VIOLATES ARTICLE I, § 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The court below failed to give a thorough examination of

Snyder's due process claim, because of its dismissal of Snyder's
free exercise and establishment claims.

See Memorandum Decision,

9 (R. 482) .
The City created a protected interest when it set aside the
Opening Ceremonies as a public forum for expression.

The Utah

Constitution guarantees, once the City created this forum, that
Snyder must have equal access for the expression of his religious
view.

In particular, under Art I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution,

government benefits, such as the use of the City's property
during the Opening Ceremonies, "must be provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis" and "must be equally accessible to all."
Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938.

Thus, "if a city

permits groups to use city-owned facilities, that use must be
permitted without regard to the belief system of the user."
(emphasis added).

Id.,

Therefore, under a procedural due process

analysis, the City deprived Snyder of interests guaranteed by
specific constitutional provisions.

The City deprived Snyder of

access to a public forum—a forum to which he was constitutionally
guaranteed equal access.

As it deprived Snyder of that protected

interest, it gave him no hearing nor did the City have pre42

established criteria to apply.

For these reasons, the City

violated Snyder's due process rights.
The Utah Constitution requires government neutrality between
religious practices and non-religious practices.

It is

constitutionally necessary that the City, upon encouraging
individuals to participate in its Opening Ceremonies, not deny
individuals access to this forum because it finds their message
to be essentially secular.18

To do so violates the principle of

government neutrality between religion and non-religion.

The

City violated Snyder's rights to due process under Article I, § 7
of the Utah Constitution.

The City created a public forum for

the expression of religious and other ideas.

However, they have

no written criteria for deciding who may use that forum.

"[T]he

government must implement a system that awards the benefit so
that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically equal
opportunity for the use of the public resource."
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938.

Society of

The City established no hearing

or appeal process to be used in making the determination or in
appealing the decision.

18

Sometimes the City contends that the opening invocation
need not be religious in nature, but simply contain uplifting
thoughts.
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The language of Society of Separationists is instructive as
to what the City is required to do.

That decision mandates that

a system be established to guarantee neutral access to the forum.
"[T]he government must implement a system that awards the benefit
so that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically
equal opportunity for the use of the public resource."
of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938, (emphasis added).

Society
The City

has not implemented such a system; instead, access to the forum,
the government benefit, is controlled by the unfettered
subjective whim and fancy of the City Attorney.
Snyder has a liberty interest in the free exercise of his
religious beliefs within the public forum created by the City.
The right to practice one's chosen religion u is the very core of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
F.2d 122, 131 (2nd Cir. 1985).

Colombrito v. Kelly, 7 64

Under Society of Separationists

v. Whitehead, access to the government created forum (formal
prayer time on a city council agenda) is a state created liberty
interest.
The essential requirements of due process are notice and an
opportunity to respond.
470 U.S. 543, 546 (1985).

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
"The opportunity to present reasons,

either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be
taken is a fundamental due process requirement."
44

Id.

The City

has failed to supply Snyder with even basic protection.

In

determining how much process is due, three factors are to be
considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Matthews v. Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
In the case at bar, the private interest is Snyder's right
to free expression and exercise of his religious beliefsfundamental constitutional guarantees.

The risk of erroneous

deprivation through the procedures used is great and apparent.
Although not theologians or religious experts, the City
determined, without giving Snyder an opportunity to respond, that
Snyder's prayer is not a prayer and not a valid demonstration of
religious belief.

Simple and easy due process protections-

written criteria, notice, an opportunity to respond, an impartial
arbiter, findings, notice of the right to appeal, an appellate
review—may have prevented the harm to Snyder.
The City's summary refusal to allow Snyder access to the
public forum created by the City for the expression of religious
speech, deprived Snyder of protected interests.
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The City did so

without any criteria or hearing, thus it violated Snyder's due
process rights.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The decision of the court below is in error and should be
reversed.

The conduct of Murray City and City Attorney Hall

violated the free speech, free exercise, establishment and due
process provisions of the Utah Constitutions.

Having created and

opened a forum for religious expression, the City and Hall can
not censor ideas based upon content.

Snyder must be allowed to

present his prayer at the important and reverent time set aside
by the City for prayers before its council meetings.

Snyder must

be treated fairly and equitably in the same manner as all others
offering prayers.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of AUGUST 2001.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

u

by

BRIAN MJ BARNARD
JAMES L.\ HARRIS, Jd.
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
These issues implicate important constitutional rights and
will affect the protections afforded all Utahans.

Furthermore,

this case invokes a previous Utah Supreme Court decision, Society
of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
Appellant believes that oral argument will give the parties a
beneficial opportunity to explain their respective positions and
to answer questions from the Court.

47

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to:
Richard A. Van Wagoner
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 4500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
on the 17th day of AUGUST, 2001, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS

7

JAMES L./ HARRIS, JR.

48

APPEND IX/ATTACHMENTS
Attachment "A":

Complaint, dated August 2, 1999 (R. 1).

Attachment "B":

Letter from H. Craig Hall to Tom Snyder, June
1, 1994 (R. 128).

Attachment "C":

Letter from Tom Snyder to Jewel Chandler,
June 9, 2001 (R. 130).

Attachment "D":

Opening Prayer (R. 131-132).

Attachment "E":

Letter from H. Craig Hall to Tom Snyder, June
30, 1994 (R. 134) .
Memorandum Decision, entered on February 9,
2001 (R. 474).

Attachment "F":

49

ATTACHMENT A
C o m p l a i n t , d a t e d August 2, 1999 (R. 1 ) .

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr.
USB # 8204
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Cooperating Attorneys for
UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS &
LIBERTIES FOUNDATION, INC.
214 East 500 South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

TOM SNYDER,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
Civil No.

vs.
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation and
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney
for Murray City Corporation,

99-09 0 7 f O £

. 7Z
[_(,\&x,

(Hon.

Defendants.

Plaintiff, TOM SNYDER by and through counsel Brian M.
Barnard and James L. Harris, Jr. of the Utah Legal Clinic, as
cooperating attorneys for Utah Civil Rights and Liberties
Foundation, Inc. in this COMPLAINT as claims and causes of action
against the defendants states and alleges as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

This is a civil action for monetary damages, declaratory

relief and prospective injunctive relief to redress and prevent
violation of civil rights protected by the constitution of the
State of Utah.

Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation for harm

suffered as a result of unconstitutional conduct by the defendant
government entity and actor.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief

as to the unconstitutionality of defendants1 conduct.

Plaintiff

seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the government defendant from
similar conduct in the future.
2.

This action is timely commenced under the provisions of

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953 as amended).

A similar action

seeking the same relief was timely filed in 1994 in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, Snyder v. Murray
City Corporation & Hall, Civil No. 2:94-CV-667 and those state
claims were dismissed not upon the merits on April 13, 1999.
Snvder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995);
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Utah 1995),
aff'd in part & rev'd in part, Snyder v. Murray City Corp. 124
F.3d 1349 (10th Cir. 1997); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d
1227 (on rehearing en banc 10th Cir., 10/27/1998), cert, den'd.
3.

The basis for this action is Society of Separationists,

Inc. v. Whitehead, et al, 870 P.2d 916, (Utah 1993) which
2

interpreted and applied the applicable provisions of the Utah
Constitution holding that everyone, including atheists, has the
constitutional right to offer opening remarks before city council
meetings.

JURISDICTION
4.

Jurisdiction in this court is based on Ut. Code Ann. §

78-3-4 (1953 as amended).

Declaratory relief is authorized by

Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) and Rule 57 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Injunctive relief is author-

ized by Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended) and Rule 65A of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

VENUE
5.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Ut. Code Ann.

§ 78-13-2(2) (1953 as amended).

All of the conduct complained of

occurred or will occur in Salt Lake County, Utah.

The named

individual parties to this action reside in Salt Lake County,
Utah.

Murray City Corporation has its place of business in Salt

Lake County, Utah.

3

PARTIES
6.

The plaintiff TOM SNYDER is an adult citizen and a

resident of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County, Utah.
7.

At pertinent times, H. CRAIG HALL was the City Attorney

for the defendant MURRAY CITY CORPORATION.
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION.

He was an employee of

He had the administrative power to

determine who would give prayers before meetings of the Murray
City Council.

He had the administrative power to determine what

will be recited in prayers given before meetings of the Murray
City Council.

H. CRAIG HALL is no longer City Attorney of MURRAY

CITY CORPORATION.

Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief and

monetary damages against this individual defendant.
8.

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION is a government entity created

pursuant to Utah State statute and governs the geographic area
known as Murray, Utah located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
subdivision of the State of Utah.

It is a

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION was

the employer of the individual defendant H. CRAIG HALL and is the
employer of his successor.

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION delegated to

H. CRAIG HALL and his successor the administrative power to
determine who will give prayers before meetings of the Murray
City Council and the administrative power to determine what will
be recited in prayers given before meetings of the Murray City
Council.
4

FACTS
9.

On March 23, 1994 the plaintiff wrote a letter to Jewel

Chandler, an agent of MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, requesting information about the offering of prayers before meetings of the
Murray City Council.

A copy of that letter is attached, marked

as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
10.

The plaintiff never received a response to his March

23, 1994 (Exhibit "A") letter.
11.

On May 9, 1994 the plaintiff wrote a second letter to

Jewel Chandler requesting information about offering a prayer
before a meeting of the Murray City Council.

A copy of that

letter is attached, marked as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein
by reference.
12.

The plaintiff received a response to his letters in a

letter dated June 1, 1994 from H. Craig Hall, Murray City
Attorney.

A copy of that letter is attached hereto, marked

Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference.
13.

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION for a long time has had a

practice that all Murray City Council meetings will start with a
prayer.

Exhibit "C" attached.

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION has no

specifically adopted guidelines or policies regarding the nature
and/or content of prayers to be offered at the beginning of
meetings of the Murray City Council.
5

Exhibit "C" attached.

14.

An administrative decision as to who may offer a prayer

before a Murray City Council meeting was left to the sole discretion of defendant H. CRAIG HALL.

An administrative decision

as to the content of a prayer that may be offered before a Murray
City Council meeting was left to the sole discretion of defendant
H. CRAIG HALL.
15.

H. CRAIG HALL had the power on behalf of MURRAY CITY

CORPORATION to administratively determine if a proposed prayer to
be offered before a Murray City Council meeting is indeed a
prayer and whether it will be allowed to be presented.
16.

H. CRAIG HALL had the administrative power on behalf of

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION to determine if a proposed prayer to be
offered before a Murray City Council meeting is not a prayer but
rather an expression of "political views, [an] attack [on] city
policies or practices or [the] mock[ing of] city practices or
policies" which he would not allow to be presented before a
Murray City Council meeting as a prayer.

Exhibit "C" & Exhibit

"F" attached.
17.

On June 9, 1994 the plaintiff wrote a third letter to

Jewel Chandler specifically asking to be allowed to appear and
present a prayer before a meeting of the Murray City Council.
copy of that letter is attached, marked as Exhibit "D" and
incorporated herein by reference.
6

A

18.

Along with his letter of June 9, 1994 to Jewel

Chandler, the plaintiff enclosed a copy of the prayer that he
asked to be allowed to present before a meeting of the Murray
City Council.

A copy of that proposed prayer is attached, marked

as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference.
19.

The proposed prayer (Exhibit "F") contains and sets

forth deeply held and sincere religious beliefs of the plaintiff
and conveys a religious message with regard to public prayers
sponsored and encouraged by government entities.
20.

In a letter dated June 30, 1994, the defendant H. CRAIG

HALL informed the plaintiff that plaintiff's proposed prayer
(Exhibit "E" attached) was "unacceptable" and that based upon the
content of the proposed prayer, the plaintiff would not be
invited to participate in the opening ceremonies of a Murray City
Council meeting.

A true and correct copy of that rejection

letter is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "F" and incorporated
herein by reference.
21.

Murray City has no adopted written rules, regulations,

policies or practices to govern what religious exercises or
prayers may be offered by what entities, when or under what
circumstances before a Murray City Council meeting.

Murray City

has no specifically adopted written guidelines or policies

7

regarding the nature and/or content of prayers that may be
offered before meetings of the Murray City Council.
22.

An administrative decision as to who may say a prayer

before the Murray City Council was and is left to the sole
discretion of defendant Craig Hall or his successor.

An

administrative decision as to the content of religious exercise
or prayer to be offered before a meeting of the Murray City
Council is left to the sole discretion of defendant Hall or his
successor.
23.

Defendant Hall had and his successor has the

administrative power on behalf of Murray City to determine if a
proposed prayer is appropriate and will be allowed to be recited
before a Murray City Council meeting.
24.

Defendants have established no appeal process whereby a

party can challenge or have reviewed a denial by the City or its
agent of a request to give a prayer before a Murray City Council
meeting.
25.

In his letter of June 30, 1994, defendant Hall informed

the plaintiff that plaintiff's offer to give a prayer at a Murray
City Council meeting was denied.
26.

Exhibit "F" attached.

The denial by defendants of plaintiff's request to give

a prayer at the Murray City Council meeting constitutes a
substantial burden on the plaintiff's exercise of his religion.
8

No compelling state interest or justification exists for the
defendants1 refusal to allow plaintiff to exercise his religion
and say a prayer in the same manner and in the same place that
defendants have allowed others to say prayers for many years.
27.

Plaintiff was offered no right to appeal the denial;

plaintiff was not informed of any procedure whereby he could
appeal the denial of his request.
28.

At all times pertinent to this action the defendants

were acting under color of state law and with the power and
authority granted to them by the laws of the state of Utah.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
State Free Exercise
29.

The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to

say a prayer before the Murray City Council violates the free
exercise provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
30.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that

the defendants1 conduct is in violation of his right to the free
exercise of his religious beliefs as protected by the Utah
Constitution.
31.

The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the

defendant City cease its conduct in violation of his right to the

9

9

free exercise of his religious beliefs as protected by the Utah
Constitution.
32.

The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as

against the defendants for violation of the Utah State
Constitutional provision protecting free exercise of religion
(Art. I, § 4) in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in an
amount to be determined at trial.

The right of a person to free

exercise of religion without burden, limitation or restriction by
governmental entities is precious and valuable beyond estimation.
33.

The conduct of the defendants in seeking to censor the

ideas of the plaintiff is a direct and severe violation of the
Utah Constitutional protection of free exercise of religion.

The

conduct of the defendants is so egregious as to warrant the
imposition of punitive damages in the sum of at least one dollar
($1.00) but in an amount to be determined at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
State Establishment Clause
34.

The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to

offer his prayer before the Murray City Council violates the
establishment provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
35.

The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to

offer his prayer before the Murray City Council has favored or
10

established other religions over those of plaintiff in violation
of the establishment provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.
36.

The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to

offer his prayer before the Murray City Council has disfavored or
acted against the religious ideals of plaintiff in violation of
the establishment provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.
37.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that

the defendants1 conduct is in violation of the establishment
provision of the Utah Constitution.
38.

The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the

defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the
establishment provision of the Utah Constitution.
39.

The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as

against the defendants for violation of the Utah State
Constitutional provision against the establishment of religion
(Art. I, § 4) in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in an
amount to be determined at trial.

The right of a person not to

suffer as a result of government favoring certain religious
ideals over those of other persons is precious and valuable
beyond estimation.
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40.

The conduct of the defendants in seeking to establish

and promote religious ideals of persons to the exclusion of the
plaintiff is a direct and severe violation of the Utah
Constitutional.

The conduct of the defendants is so egregious as

to warrant the imposition of punitive damages in the sum of at
least one dollar ($1.00) but in an amount to be determined at
trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
State Due Process
41.

The actions of the defendants as set forth above have

established a limited public forum.

Defendants have created a

forum for the expression of religious beliefs and for the giving
of prayers during and at meetings of the Murray City Council.
42.

Defendants have no criteria with which to decide who

may use the state created public forum for the expression of
religious beliefs or for the giving of a prayer.
43.

Defendants have no hearing, appeal, etc., process with

which to decide who may use the state created public forum for
the expression of religious beliefs or for the giving of a
prayer.
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44.

The right of a person to have access to a government

created forum is a liberty interest of which a person cannot be
deprived without due process.
45.

The summary refusal of the defendants to allow the

plaintiff to have access to the created public forum for the
expression of his religious beliefs and the giving of a prayer
violates the due process provision of the Utah Constitution.
Art. I, § 7.
46.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that

the defendants1 conduct in denying him access to a state created
forum without due process is a violation of the Utah
Constitution.
47.

The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the

defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the due process
clause of the Utah Constitution.
48.

The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as

against the defendants for violation of the Utah State
Constitutional provision protecting liberty interests with due
process (Art. I, § 7) in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00)
but in an amount to be determined at trial.

The right of a

person not to be deprived of a liberty interest by governmental
action absent due process is precious and valuable beyond
estimation.
13

49.

The conduct of the defendants in depriving plaintiff of

a liberty interest without due process is a direct and severe
violation of the Utah Constitution.

The conduct of the

defendants is so egregious as to warrant the imposition of
punitive damages in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in
an amount to be determined at trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
State Free Speech
50.

The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to

give a prayer before a meeting of the Murray City Council
violated the plaintiff's right to free speech.
51.

The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as

against the defendants for violation of the Utah State
Constitutional provision protecting free speech (Art. I, § 15) in
the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in an amount to be
determined at trial.

The right of a person to free speech

without burden, limitation or restriction by governmental
entities is precious and valuable beyond estimation.
52.

The conduct of the defendants in seeking to censor the

ideas of the plaintiff is a direct and severe violation of the
Utah Constitutional protection of free speech.

The conduct of

the defendants is so egregious as to warrant the imposition of
14

punitive damages in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in
an amount to be determined at trial.
53.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that

the defendants1 conduct is in violation of the free speech
provisions of the Utah Constitution.
54.

The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the

defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the free speech
provisions of the Utah Constitution.

DEMAND FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands the following relief:
1.

The plaintiff is entitled to damages as against the

defendants for violation of his right to free speech,
establishment clause, the free exercise of his religious beliefs
and his due process rights as protected by the Utah Constitution
in an amount to be determined at trial but in the sum of at least
one dollar ($1.00) .
2.

The plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages as against

the defendants for violation of his right to free speech,
establishment clause, the free exercise of his religious beliefs
and his due process rights as protected by the Utah Constitution
in an amount to be determined at trial but in the sum of at least
one dollar ($1.00) .
15

3.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that the

defendants1 conduct is in violation of free speech, the free
exercise protection, the establishment protection and the due
process protections of the Utah Constitution.
4.

The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the

defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the free speech,
free exercise protection, establishment protection and the due
process protections of the Utah Constitution.
5.

If and to the extent allowed by law, plaintiff seeks an

award of attorney fees and court costs.
6.

For such other and further relief as the court deems

just and proper.
DATED this 2nd day of AUGUST, 1999.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT to:
ALAN LARSON
RICHARD VAN WAGONER
Attorneys for Defendants
# 1100
Newhouse Building
12 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
FRANK NAKAMURA
Murray City Attorney
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION
5025 South State Street
Murray, Utah
84107
on the 2nd day of AUGUST, 1999, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Exhibit "A"

—

Letter from Plaintiff to Jewel Chandler
dated March 23, 1994

Exhibit "B"

—

Letter from Plaintiff to Jewel Chandler
dated May 9, 1994

Exhibit "C"

—
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dated June 1, 1994

Exhibit "D"

—

Letter from Plaintiff to Jewel Chandler
dated June 9, 1994

Exhibit "E"

—

Plaintiff's Proposed Opening Prayer

Exhibit "F"

—

Letter from Craig Hall to Plaintiff
dated June 30, 1994
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March 2 3 ,

1994

J e w e l Chandler
C i t y Council Offices
Murray C i t y
5 0 2 3 South State S t r e e t
M u r r a y , Utah 34107
Re:

Prayer B e f o r e C i t y C o u n c i l

Meetings

D e a r Ms* Chandler:
I am i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e s e n t i n g a p r a y e r before t h e
M u r r a y C i t y Council a t o n e o f i t / s u p c o m i n g m e e t i n g s .
I 'would a p p r e c i a t e i t i£ y o u c o u l d p r o v i d e me any
w r i t t e n i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o g u i d e l i n e s or
r e s t r i c t i o n s ( i f any) w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n ofsuch prayers.
Is there a t i m e l i m i t ?
I s there a selection
p r o c e s s that: one neads t o g o t h r o u g h ?
I s t h e r e some
c r i t e r i a t h a r e s t a b l i s h e s w h o may b e a b l e t o o f f e r a prayer?
I looJc forward t o p a r t i c i p a t i n g
C o u n c i l meeting of t h e Murray C i r y .

i n a n upcoming C i t y

Sincerely,

TOM SNYDER
P.O B o x S79-71
Murray, Utah
84157

i

EXHIBIT
A,

May 9 ,

1994

J e w e l Chandler*
C i t y C o u n c i l Offices
Murray C i t y
5 0 2 5 South" State Street
Murray, Utah. 84107
D e a r Ms. Chandler:
I w r o t e to you on March 2 3 , 1 9 9 4 . A copy of that
l e t t e r i s enclosed. I have n o t h e a r d from you in response
t o my l e t t e r .
Should I assume that t h e r e a r e no w r i t t e n guidelines or
r e s t r i c t i o n s with regarda t o t l i e p r e s e n t a t i o n of prayers
b e f o r e c i t y council meetings.
As I indicated in my l e t t e r I am i n t e r e s t e d -in
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in an upcoming c i t y c o u n c i l meeting by
o f f e r i n g a prayer.
May I please hear from you?
Sincerely,

TOM SNYDER
P.O. Box 57971
Murray, Utah 8 4157
Enclosure

PLAINTIFFS «*•
EXHIBIT
«>/
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MURRAY
CITY
CORPORATION

H. Craig Hall
City Attorney
264-2640

June L, 1994

Mr, Tom Snvder
P. 0. Box 57971
Murray,- UT 84157
Re:

Request to Utter a Prayer

Dear Mr. Snyder:
Your r e q u e s t t o p r e s e n t a p r a y e r b e f o r e t h e C i t y Council has
been f o r w a r d e d t o my o f f i c e for r e v i e w .
The M u n i c i p a l Council has n o t e s t a b l i s h e d formal p o l i c i e s
r e g a r d i n g t h e n a t u r e and/or c o n t e n t of t h i s r e v e r e n c e p o r t i o n of
t h e i r a g e n d a . However, t h e C o u n c i l h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e p o l i c y
t h a t a l l c o u n c i l meetings w i l l s t a r t w i t h p r a y e r .
The p u r p o s e of the "prayer 11 i s t o a l l o w i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t
o p p o r t u n i t y to express t h o u g h t s , l e a v e b l e s s i n g s , e t c . I t i s n o t
a time t o e x p r e s s p o l i t i c a l v i e w s , a t t a c k c i t y p o l i c i e s or p r a c t i c e s o r mock c i t y p r a c t i c e s o r p o l i c i e s .
Comments on p r e s e n t c i t y p r a c t i c e s o r p o l i c i e s may be made
a t c i t y c o u n c i l meetings by one o f two m e t h o d s ; e i t h e r by r e q u e s t i n g t o be p l a c e d on the agenda^, o r , t a k i n g up t o t h r e e minutes
d u r i n g t h e " c i t i z e n comment" p o r t i o n of t h e ^ m e e t i n g . The l a t e r
method r e q u i r e s no p r i o r a r r a n g e m e n t s t o be made.
Sincerely,

. Craig K l l
Murray C i t ^ v ^ t t o r n e y
HCH:dg

TOM SNYDER
POST OFFICE BOX 57971
MURRAY, UTAH
84157
June 9, 1994
Jewel Chandler

AcTm i nis~trative Offices
Murray C i t y
Murray Municipal Building
5025 South State Street
P.O. Box 57520

Murray, Utah 34157-0520
Re:

P r a y e r s before City Council Meetings

Dear Ms, Chandler:
X understand t h a t Murray City and t h e City CoTmcil
encourages t h e practice of having p r a y e r s offered 5y
c i t i z e n s before City Council m e e t i n g s .
I would liJce to appear and o f f e r a p r a y e r at the next
a v a i l a b l e meeting.
Enclosed i s a copy of t h e p r a y e r t h a t I will give*
P l e a s e l e t me know immediately when you want me to give
t h i s prayer.
ThanJc you.
Sincerely,

DtUrrrrtr<t5yyDCP£y.PRY

PUUJJTIFP^I
EXHIBIT
I

OPENING PRAYER
OUR MOTHER,

WHO ART I N HEAVEN

(IF,

INDEED THESE

I S A HEAVEN AND I F TEERE I S A GOD THAT TAKES A WOMAN'S FORM)
HALLOWED BE THY NAME, WE ASR FOR THY B L E S S I N G FOR AND
GUIDANCE OF THOSE TEAT WILL P A R T I C I P A T E I N T H I S MEETING AND
FOR THOSE MORTALS TEAT GOVERN THE STATE OF UTAH;
WE FERVENTLY ASK TEAT YOU GUIDE THE LEADERS OF THIS
CITY,

SALT LAKE COUNTY AND THE STATE OF UTAH SO TEAT THEY

MAY SEE THE WISDOM OF SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE AND SO
THAT THEY WILL NEVER AGAIN PERFORM DEMEANING RELIGIOUS
CEREMONIES AS FART OF OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS;
WE PRAY TEAT YOU PREVENT SELF-RIGHTEOUS POLITICIANS
FROM M I S - U S I N G TEE NAME OF GOD I N CONDUCTING GOVERNMENT
MEETINGS; AND, THAT YOU LEAD THEM AWAY *FROM THE HYPOCRITICAL
AND BLASPHEMOUS DECEPTION OF THE P U B L I C , ATTEMPTING TO MAKE
THE PEOPLE BELIEVE TEAT BUREAUCRATS'

D E C I S I O N S AND ACTIONS

HAVE THY STAMP OF APPROVAL I F PRAYERS ARE OFFERED AT TEE
BEGINNING OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS ;
WE ASK

TEAT YOU GRANT UTAH'S LEADERS AND POLITICIANS

ENOUGH COURAGE AND DISCERNMENT TO UNDERSTAND TEAT RELIGION
I S A PRIVATE MATTER BETWEEN EVERY I N D I V I D U A L AND HIS OR HER
DEITY/

WE BESEECH THEE TO EDUCATE GOVERNMENT LEADER^

R E L I G I O U S BELIEFS SHOULD NOT BE BROADCAST AND REVEALED FOR
THE PURPOSE OF IMPRESSING OTHERS; WE PRAY THAT YOU STRIKE
DOWN THOSE THAT MIS-USE YOUR NAME AND THOSE TEAT CHEAPEN THE
I N S T I T U T I O N OF PRAYER BY USING I T FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH
P O L I T I C A L GAINS;
WE ASK THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH WILL SOME
DAY LEARN THE WISDOM OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE;
WE ASK TEAT YOU WILL TEACH-TEE PEOPLE OF UTAH TEAT
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE I N R E L I G I O N ; WZ PRAY THAT
YOU SMITE THOSE GOVERNMENT O F F I C I A L S TEAT WOULD ATTEMPT TO
CENSOR OR CONTROL PRAYERS MADE BY ANYONE TO YOU OR TO ANY
OTHER OF OUR GODS;
WE ASK TEAT YOU DELIVER US FROM TEE EVXL OF rORCED
RELZGTOUS WORSHIP NOW SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED UPON TEE PEOPLE
OF TEE STATE OF UTAH BY TEE ACTIONS OF MIS-GUIDED, WEAK AND
S T U P I D POLITICIANS, WHO ABUSE POWER T N * T E E I R OWN SZLFRIGHTEOUSNESS ;
ALL OF THIS WE ASK I N THY NAME AND LN TEE NAME OF THY
SON

(IF

I N FACT YOU HAD A SON THAT V I S I T E D EARTH) FOR TEE

ETERNAL BETTERMENT OF ALL OF US WHO POPULATE THE GREAT STATE
OF UTAH.
AMENC:Ueasx\SNrDOPSf-?ar
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MURRAY
CITY
CORPORAnON
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2E5A.^U3

tTuae 3 0 , 1994

Mr. tlTcm Snydax'
P . Q. 3 c x 57971
m r r a r y , UT 34157
2e:

Racneat to Utrar a Prayer

Cear Mr* Snyder s
Yonr proposed" prayer senr t o t h e MrrrTf.cigal Conncil has 2;eea
for">rarded> t o my o f f i c e for response*
The t e x t : o f t i e proposed prayer i s n n a c c s p t a h l e - I t dees
n e t follc-tr t h e guidelines s e t f o r t h i n my l e t t e r dated J"UM I f
1994* U n t i l your proposed prayer s a t i s f i e s tbe<se guidelines, an
i z r r i n a t i c n t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n our o p e n i n g c e r m o a i a s w i l l set be
A l l correspondence regarding* t h i s m a t t e r shorxld be directed
t o rry o f fmi c e I f j c u bare any q u e s t i o n s p l e a s e , contact ne d i rectly.
Z wcnld appreciate a phone n n s h e r t h a t I may d i s c o s
t h i s m a t t s r w i t h yon during the day*
Sincerely ,

EC3:dg
2:c: Mayor Lynn ?<. Pett
Hxzrrray C i t y Hnnicipal Conner 1

Murr^xr City M u r s c p a i Sytldirg

« 5K2 Scutft State S f r w i

* P.O. 3 « 57222

* Murnty. Utifl 34T37-C22SX

l

EXH.B.T

|

ATTACHMENT B
Letter from H. Craig Hall to Tom Snyder,
June 1, 1994 (R. 128) .

*RAY

H. Craig Hall

MURRAY
CITY
CORPORATION

City Attorney
264-2640

J u n e L* 19 9 4

Mr, Tom Snyder
P. 0. Box 57971
Murray, UT 84157
Re:

Request to Utter a Prayer

Dear Mr. Snyder:

Your request to present a prayer before the City Council has
been forwarded to my office for review.
The Municipal Council has not e s t a b l i s h e d formal p o l i c i e s
regarding the nature and/or content of t h i s reverence portion of
t h e i r agenda. However, the Council has e s t a b l i s h e d the policy
t h a t a l l council meetings will s t a r t with p r a y e r .
The purpose of the "prayer" i s to allow i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t
opportunity to express thoughts, leave b l e s s i n g s , e t c . I t i s not
a time to- express p o l i t i c a l views, a t t a c k c i t y p o l i c i e s or pract i c e s or mock c i t y practices or p o l i c i e s .
Comments on present city p r a c t i c e s o r p o l i c i e s may be made
a t c i t y council meetings by one of two methods; e i t h e r by requesting to be placed on the agenda/ o r , t a k i n g up to t h r e e minutes
during the " c i t i z e n comment" portion of t h e meeting. The l a t e r
method r e q u i r e s no prior arrangements to be made.
Sincerely,
^H. Crazg
Murray Cit£y-C&ttorney
HCH:dg

Murray City Municipal Building

. 5025 South State S(r*»»»

-on

Sn» *Tv>n
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ATTACHMENT C
Letter from Tom Snyder to Jewel Chandler,
June 9, 2001 (R. 130).

RECEIVED
MURRAY CITY COUNCIL
—

r

„> •,

-

TOM-SNYDER
POST OFFICE BOX 57971
MURRAY, UTAH
84157
June 9, 1994
Jewel Chandler
Administrative Offices
Murray City
Murray Municipal Building
5025 South State Street
P.O. Box 57520
M u r r a y , Utah 34157-0520
Re:

P r a y e r s before City Council

D e a r Ms.

Meetings

Chandler:

I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Murray C i t y and t h e C i t y Council
e n c o u r a g e s t h e p r a c t i c e of h a v i n g p r a y e r s o f f e r e d by
c i t i z e n s before City Council m e e t i n g s .
I would l i k e t o a p p e a r and o f f e r
a v a i l a b l e meeting.

a prayer at the next

E n c l o s e d i s a copy of t h e p r a y e r t h a t I w i l l g i v e .
this

P l e a s e l e t me know, i m m e d i a t e l y when you want me t o
prayer.
Thank you.
Sincerely,

TOM SNYDER
D:\Icctcr\SNYDOPEN.PRY

give

ATTACHMENT D
Opening Prayer (R. 131-132) .

OPENING PRAYER
OUR MOTHER.

WHO ART IN HEAVEN ( I F ,

INDEED THERE

I S A HEAVEN AND I F THERE I S A GOD THAT TAKES A WOMAN'S FORM)
HALLOWED BE THY NAME, WE ASK FOR THY BLESSING FOR AND
GUIDANCE OF THOSE THAT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING AND
FOR THOSE MORTALS THAT GOVERN THE STATE OF UTAH;
WE FERVENTLY ASK THAT YOU GUIDE THE LEADERS OF THIS
CITY,

SALT LAKE COUNTY AND THE STATE OF UTAH SO THAT THEY

MAY SEE THE WISDOM OF SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE AND SO
THAT THEY WILL NEVER AGAIN PERFORM DEMEANING RELIGIOUS
CEREMONIES AS PART OF OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS;
WE PRAY THAT YOU PREVENT SELF-RIGHTEOUS POLITICIANS
FROM MIS-USING THE NAME OF GOD IN CONDUCTING GOVERNMENT
MEETINGS; AND, THAT YOU LEAD THEM AWAY FROM THE HYPOCRITICAL
i

AND BLASPHEMOUS DECEPTION OF THE PUBLIC, ATTEMPTING TO MAKE
THE PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT BUREAUCRATS' DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
HAVE THY STAMP OF APPROVAL I F PRAYERS ARE OFFERED AT THE
BEGINNING OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS;
WE ASK THAT YOU GRANT UTAH'S LEADERS AND POLITICIANS
ENOUGH COURAGE AND DISCERNMENT .TO UNDERSTAND THAT RELIGION
I S A PRIVATE MATTER BETWEEN EVERY INDIVIDUAL AND HIS OR HER
DEITY; WE BESEECH THEE TO EDUCATE GOVERNMENT LEADERS THAT

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS SHOULD NOT BE BROADCAST AND REVEALED FOR
THE PURPOSE OF IMPRESSING OTHERS; WE PRAY THAT YOU STRIKE
DOWN THOSE THAT MIS-USE YOUR NAME AND THOSE THAT CHEAPEN THE
INSTITUTION OF PRAYER BY USING IT FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH
POLITICAL GAINS;
WE ASK THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH WILL SOME
DAY LEARN THE WISDOM OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE;
WE ASK THAT YOU WILL TEACH THE PEOPLE OF UTAH THAT
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN RELIGION; WE PRAY THAT
YOU SMITE THOSE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT WOULD ATTEMPT TO
CENSOR OR CONTROL PRAYERS MADE BY ANYONE TO YOU OR TO ANY
OTHER OF OUR GODS;
WE ASK THAT YOU DELIVER US FROM THE EVIL OF FORCED
RELIGIOUS WORSHIP NOW SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED UPON THE PEOPLE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY THE ACTIONS OF MIS-GUIDED, WEAK AND
STUPID POLITICIANS, WHO ABUSE POWER IN THEIR OWN SELFRIGHTEOUSNESS;
ALL OF THIS WE ASK IN THY NAME AND IN THE NAME OF THY
SON (IF IN FACT YOU HAD A SON THAT VISITED EARTH) FOR THE
ETERNAL BETTERMENT OF ALL OF US WHO POPULATE THE GREAT STATE
OF UTAH.
AMEN.
C.UetteriSNYDOPEN.PRY
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ATTACHMENT E
Letter from H. Craig Hall to Tom Snyder,
June 30, 1994 (R. 134) .

***£«*•>

MURRAY

H_ Craig HaJ!
QtyAnomoy

cmr

CORPORATION
•SACT

June 3 0 , 1334

Mr. Tom Snyder
P. O. Bex 57971
Marray, UT 841J57
Re:

Reqrxes-fc to Utter a Prayer

Gear Mr. Snyder r
Yoxsr proposed" prayer sent t o t h e Municipal Coxsncil has b**n
forwarded t o my o f f i c e for responseT i e t e x t ot the proposed prayer i s u n a c c e p t a b l e - I t does
n e t f o l l o w tiie guidelines s e t f o r t h i n sty l a t t e r dated Jfcae I ,
1394;
U n t i l your proposed prayer s a t i s f i e s t h e s e gt^Ldelines, ^n
i i r r i t a t i o n 1 t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n our opening ceremonies w i l l not be
forthcoming «
A l l correspondence regarding t h i s m a t t e r should be directed
t o sxy o f f i c e I f yon bare any q u e s t i o n s p l e a s e , contact ne d i rectly.
X wcnld appreciate a phone nrssber t h a t I may discuss
t h i s m a t t a r w i t h yon daring: the day*
S i n c e r e l yk
^ S w,.£r3±*
<

Murray Citfy a t t o r n e y

HC3:dg-

arc:

Hayor Z»ynzx P* Pett
Murray C i t y Municipal Council

Murr^CKyMunKcioaJStAldSrr? « 3 » Soutii SW» S t r u t

*

P.O. 3c% 37328

*

Muffa* Uttti MT5T-02B

\M

ATTACHMENT F
Memorandum Decision,
entered on February 9, 2001 (R. 474).

ILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
9 2001

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TOM SNYDER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 990907806

vs.
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a
municipal corporation and
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney
for Murray City Corporation,
Defendants.

Plaintiff claims that Murray City's denial of his offer to
pray before the City Council meeting interferes with his exercise
of religion under the free exercise guaranteed by Article I,
Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, He further argues that Murray
City

violated

the

establishment

clause

and that he has been

deprived of the liberty interests without due process.
claims a violation of his free speech right.

He further

The defendant's

Motion to Dismiss the free speech claim under Article I, Section
15, of the Utah Constitution is granted based on the five year
statute of limitations.
Article I, Section 4, provides that:
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The
State shall make Vno laws respecting an establishment of
re-iligion, or prohibiting^ the free exercise thereof; no
religious test sh%ll be required as qualification for any
office of public'trustsor for any vote at any election;

t
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof.
There shall be no union of Church and State nor shall any
church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions.
No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or for the support of any
ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification
shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office,
except as provided in this Constitution.
Plaintiff argues that the defendant did not remain neutral and
therefore violated plaintiff's right to free exercise.

The City

argues that it does not have an affirmative duty to provide Snyder
with a forum in which to exercise his religion.

Furthermore, the

City contends that it did offer Snyder the opportunity to speak
during the public comment period of the meeting.

Finally, the City

claims that Snyder did not have a deeply held religious belief in
the practice he seeks to exercise.
Snyder admits that his purpose in volunteering to offer prayer
before the Murray City Council meeting was to illustrate to the
Murray City Council the error in their prayer policy and to get
them to abandon said policy.

To this end, the Snyder "prayer" is

really a protest and since Snyder chose to style his political
commentary as a "prayer," it makes a mockery of prayer for the
purpose of embarrassing the listeners, it contains no sincere
application

to any form of deity, and as pointed out by the

defendant in their briefs, it is critical of the policy of Murray

SNYDER V.
MURRAY CITY

PAGE 3
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City and criticizes politicians in general and any coincidental
bumping together of church and state.
The free exercise clause bars any law prohibiting the free
exercise of religion.

This is for the purpose of preventing

government from outlawing or seriously burdening a person's pursuit
of religion.

The City relies primarily on the conclusions of the

United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals
in determining that it did not violate Utahfs free exercise clause.
In response, Snyder argues that reliance upon federal decisions is
improper because the Utah Constitution provides individuals with
greater protection than federal law.
thereof

Snyder

cites

Society

of

This is true, and in support
Separationists

v.

Whitehead,

claiming that the City did not remain neutral and therefore his
free exercise rights were violated (870 P.2d 916 (1993)).
While the Society of Separationists is instructive, the issues
are distinguishable from the present case.

First, Society of

Separationists contains a direct challenge to Salt Lake City's
policy allowing prayer at the beginning of City Council meetings.
Snyder does not challenge the policy of allowing prayer, but
challenges instead the accessibility of the opportunity to give a
prayer to all individuals.

Second, Society of Separationists

focuses on that portion of Article I, Section 4, which provides
that "no public money or property shall be appropriated for or
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applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for
the support of any ecclesiastical establishment,"
To be valid, a free exercise claim must involve a "religious
belief." Snyder provides this Court with an Affidavit stating that
the convictions and beliefs expressed in his prayer are sincere and
religious.

He also provides an Affidavit from a philosophy

professor at the University of Utah stating that his "statement" is
a "prayer."

The federal court in the Snyder case found that

Snyder's speech was political and not religious.

This Court

differs with both Affidavits recognizing that Snyder's statement is
clearly non-religious, while it may be sincere.
The City argues that it did not have an affirmative duty to
provide Snyder with a forum in which to exercise his "religion" and
that it has a right to run a Council meeting subject to rules of
order and stability, and that it is completely reasonable to
require Snyder to speak during the public comment portion of the
meeting.

Murray City's policy and practice has been to have an

opening ceremony with a purpose of promoting civility, lofty
thoughts, attention to agenda items and to clear out the clutter of
the day.

Snyder's statement is contrary to said purpose.

As argued by Snyder, the Utah Supreme Court in Society of
separationists states that the Utah Constitution provides greater
protection than federal law.

Society of Separationists gives an
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worship,

exercise

or

instruction," but Snyder's statement still falls without that
definition.

However, under Society of Separationists, whether or

not the "prayer11 is inherently religious may not be dispositive
because a non-religious statement should be given the same rights
to expression as a religious statement.
Snyder argues that the City violates the establishment clause
by disallowing the presentation of Snyder's beliefs while allowing
other religious beliefs and ideas to be presented.

Snyder argues

that the City improperly prefers religion over non-religion in
violation of Article I, Section 4. Furthermore, Snyder claims the
City did not have any policy or practice regarding who can perform
an opening prayer, a claim which appears to be valid.
The City argues that permitting Snyder's "prayer" would have
violated the Society of Separationists. since under that case
opening ceremonies cannot be used for proselytizing. In Society of
Separationists the court stated that prayer is "a portable, yet
inherently religious, exercise.

It need not occur within a group

of celebrants to take on religious character,
there.

although it may arise

One person praying, silently or aloud, alone in a crowd,

among nonbelievers or believers, is still participating in a
religious exercise. We think to hold otherwise would demean prayer
and those who practice it." Snyder's "prayer" fails to meet this
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definition of religious exercise and to include it as a prayer or
as an exercise of religion would demean those who do pray and who
practice religion.
Again, Society of Separationists is distinguishable from the
instant case. As stated above, it contains a direct challenge to
Salt Lake Cityfs policy allowing prayer at the beginning of City
Council meetings, which is not a challenge that Snyder makes.
challenges accessibility.

He

Society of Separationists focuses on

that portion of Article I, Section 4, regarding the expenditure of
public money in support of an ecclesiastical establishment and that
appears to not be at issue in the instant case.

In the Society of

Separationists action the Salt Lake City Council's opening ceremony
policy had been adopted, but was not formalized as an ordinance or
resolution, however, the policy was formalized as a resolution soon
thereafter. The Society of Sssparationists court specifically noted
that it did not believe that the informal status of the policy at
the time the lawsuit filed was "outcome determinative." The Murray
City policy was less formal if anything than the City Council's
policy,

and

it

is uncertain whether Murray

City

intended

to

formalize that policy or not.
Although the Utah Constitution provides greater protection
than

federal

interest.

law,

Judge

the
Greene

federal

court's

of the United

interpretation
States

District

is

of

Court
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did

not

violate

the

federal

establishment clause and was "properly excluded from the reverence
portion of the meeting, however, because it disparages the faith
and beliefs of others, and contains political commentary concerning
the City's practices and it proselytizes and advances plaintiff's
belief concerning church and state."
902 F.Supp. 1444, 1452 (1995).

Snyder v. Murray City Corp.,

The United States Court of Appeals

held that the "establishment clause does not give any individual
the right to establish his religion by guaranteeing an opportunity
to pray during public meetings and certainly does not require
Murray City to permit all comers to speak during the reverence
portion of its City Council meetings."

Snyder v. Murray City

Corp.. 124 F.3d 1349, 1353 (1997).
In order to avoid a religious clause challenge, it appears
that Murray City must engage in an opening ceremony based upon the
concept of government neutrality.

Whether or not the Utah Supreme

Court in Society of Separationists envisioned that governmental
neutrality would encompass a "prayer" such as Snyder's "prayer" is
unclear.

Under

its

discussion

of

neutrality,

Society

of

Separationists indicates that absolute neutrality may mean that the
City cannot discriminate based on an individual's belief system.
This notion of neutrality is applied by the court in the context of
concluding that all groups who want to use City facilities must
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However, equal use of City facilities may not

amount to an equal opportunity to provide disparaging remarks
during the opening portion of the City Council meeting.

The City

emphasizes this point, claiming that Society of Separationists
endorsed "generic" statements made at the opening ceremony and did
not encourage proselytizing.

Snyder, on the other hand, claims

that if only generic statements are allowed, the concept of prayer
becomes essentially void.

This Court agrees with Mr. Snyder on

this premise.
Society of Separationists stands for the proposition that the
concept of government neutrality also includes equal access to all.
The Court specifically found that the Salt Lake City Council had
not favored one religion or religion in general, and the Salt Lake
City Council made efforts to assure a broad cross-section of the
community was represented.

These efforts were in compliance with

the City Council's resolution which provides in part that the
opening ceremony will (1) provide a moment during which Council
members and the audience can reflect on the importance of the
business before the Council; (2) recognize cultural diversity; and
(3) foster sensitivity for and recognize the uniqueness of all
segments of our community.

At the time Snyder brought his suit no

such formal policy existed in Murray City.
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Snyder contends that the City created a protected interest
when it scheduled the opening ceremony as a public forum for
religious expression and that the City deprived Snyder of interests
guaranteed by specific constitutional provisions.

It is difficult

to discern whether Snyder presents a procedural due process or a
substantive due process claim, and any analysis of the due process
right is dependent upon the free exercise and establishment clause
claims discussed above,
Mr. Snyder's statement is not a prayer.
clearly non-religious.

His statement was

The statement further is proselytizing, in

that its purpose is to encourage others to criticize Murray City's
policy. Society of Separationists requires non-religious claims be
given equal time with religious claims in ceremonies such as the
ones in question.

However, the nature of Snyder's statement was

clearly not contemplated by the Murray City Council in establishing
its policy, and Mr. Snyder was offered the opportunity to speak
during the later portion of the meeting more appropriate for
political statements.
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Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Dated this

c day of February, 2 001.

Murray City
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